On your model, the fact that your thought "taco" refers to tacos in the real world really is spectacular and baffling. It's so baffling that you might consider revising some of your assumptions, like the separation between mind and world. Here's a suggestion: it's not the mind that models or represents the world but theory-theory that models or represents simulation-theory. Less cryptically: we have two minds, one analytic and the other synthetic, and the former aims to model or represent the output of the latter.
Hi Misha, thanks for replying. I have no idea what you mean by "two minds," but ultimately, what's I've written in this piece doesn't necessarily represent my views (no pun intended) perfectly. If what you mean is that theory-theory is an abstraction of the simulation theory, I could maybe get on board.
Take a look at my Heideggerian pieces, which might align with your views (and mine) better. I will say, though, it's hard to get around the fact that what's in our minds seems not to be the world. The taco is not the same as the world-taco--the world exists independently of the mind, it seems. You can manipulate the concept of taco, imaging it made of lava and rocks, for example, despite there not existing a lava-rock taco in the mind-independent world.
You know how conceptual analysis is a matter of modeling conceptual intuitions? I'm suggesting that theory-theory corresponds to analysis -- that which is doing the modeling -- and simulation theory corresponds to intuition -- that which is being modeled. So analysis (i.e. theory-theory) aims to model intuition (i.e. simulation theory). You could say that the one is an "abstraction" of the other, but it would be more accurate to say that the one is an imperfect analytical model of the other.
I think I see your general point better, and I think it’s plausible. I’m not sold on making intuition and simulation-theory synonymous, however. Simulation theory is something like the approximate (and often unconscious) reproduction of a mental state or imaginative, embodied sympathy of another’s perspective (for example, the body/brain simulating a mild pang of hunger when seeing a malnourished person). In this way, it’s similar to intuition, in that it gives an indescribable appraisal or judgment, but different, in that it specifically simulates the mental states of another person. Sometimes, it seems like we don’t need to simulate other people’s mental states to make social judgments—we just rely on a kind of social rule book with guidelines and assumptions. But this is probably disputed.
I think both simulation theory and theory theory are probably imperfect abstractions of what’s going on. But I like your idea. Thanks for the comment
Haha, thanks for reading, Blake! Glad you enjoyed--if you want to go down the rabbit hole of abstractness, Google "misplaced concreteness." The AI will help summarize it. A great principle/tool for writers, imo.
On your model, the fact that your thought "taco" refers to tacos in the real world really is spectacular and baffling. It's so baffling that you might consider revising some of your assumptions, like the separation between mind and world. Here's a suggestion: it's not the mind that models or represents the world but theory-theory that models or represents simulation-theory. Less cryptically: we have two minds, one analytic and the other synthetic, and the former aims to model or represent the output of the latter.
Hi Misha, thanks for replying. I have no idea what you mean by "two minds," but ultimately, what's I've written in this piece doesn't necessarily represent my views (no pun intended) perfectly. If what you mean is that theory-theory is an abstraction of the simulation theory, I could maybe get on board.
Take a look at my Heideggerian pieces, which might align with your views (and mine) better. I will say, though, it's hard to get around the fact that what's in our minds seems not to be the world. The taco is not the same as the world-taco--the world exists independently of the mind, it seems. You can manipulate the concept of taco, imaging it made of lava and rocks, for example, despite there not existing a lava-rock taco in the mind-independent world.
Thoughts?
You know how conceptual analysis is a matter of modeling conceptual intuitions? I'm suggesting that theory-theory corresponds to analysis -- that which is doing the modeling -- and simulation theory corresponds to intuition -- that which is being modeled. So analysis (i.e. theory-theory) aims to model intuition (i.e. simulation theory). You could say that the one is an "abstraction" of the other, but it would be more accurate to say that the one is an imperfect analytical model of the other.
I think I see your general point better, and I think it’s plausible. I’m not sold on making intuition and simulation-theory synonymous, however. Simulation theory is something like the approximate (and often unconscious) reproduction of a mental state or imaginative, embodied sympathy of another’s perspective (for example, the body/brain simulating a mild pang of hunger when seeing a malnourished person). In this way, it’s similar to intuition, in that it gives an indescribable appraisal or judgment, but different, in that it specifically simulates the mental states of another person. Sometimes, it seems like we don’t need to simulate other people’s mental states to make social judgments—we just rely on a kind of social rule book with guidelines and assumptions. But this is probably disputed.
I think both simulation theory and theory theory are probably imperfect abstractions of what’s going on. But I like your idea. Thanks for the comment
This is great. I learned more than a few things, and I appreciate the tangible story that makes the abstract real.
But if you ask me if reality is actually abstract, could you not, just for once? : )
Also, I'm adding "Never mind. Read my blog." to my conversational lexicon.
Haha, thanks for reading, Blake! Glad you enjoyed--if you want to go down the rabbit hole of abstractness, Google "misplaced concreteness." The AI will help summarize it. A great principle/tool for writers, imo.