Can't help but read this in light of Pope Pius XII, who was the Pope during the Holocaust. He was crticized by both the Allies and Axis for his neutrality, and the Jewish community vehemently opposed his canonization due to his not being outspoken enough against Hitler. Despite this though, the Vatican functioned as one of the largest refugee networks for Holocaust survivors as well as one of the Allies' main spy networks due to the proximity of the Vatican with both Germany and Italy.
Indeed, Pius XII has been (sort of) condemned by history for doing something that was ostensibly a moral good. Some would say that he should have just been completely outspoken and dealt with the risk of opposing Hitler (such as the very real possibility that the Vatican would be taken over). Some others would say that he was simply "hedging his bets" in light of the tensions surrounding him geopolitically. He'd lean to one side or the other depending on the winds of change. Others would say that he was simply concerned with the preservation of human life, irregardless of political positioning. It makes me think that banality--as such--is independent of moral grounding. It's not that evil is inherently banal, for instance. There's something about Pius XII that makes me thing that the judgment of banal exists primarily as some kind of heuristic response to a line of decisions/actions that are on some level incomprehensible from a certain epistemic standpoint. Banality is not something that is intrinsic to any agent, but maybe rather an external judgment.
tl;dr--is there a possibility that Eichmann is only "banal" because Arendt cannot properly conceptualize his etiology? It seems a much more plausible thought to say that Eichmann was both stupid and immoral, but not banal as such. To that end, I do agree that this was primarily a psychological profiling of one person in the Nazi party. Disturbingly, there is a lot of diversisty with Nazi indoctrination--ranging from Himmler's Machiavellianism and the more violently radical antisemitism of SS personnel from Islamic territories such as Bosnia and Palestine.
Great insights Kobe. The Catholic Church is also a nearly two-thousand years old institution, so the pope's perspective is understandably removed and cautious. Something Arendt points out, however, is there where there was resistance to the "Final Solution," there were Nazis who rebelled against their orders. When the locals went along with the Holocaust, they had no social pushback, their consciences seemed to be drowned out.
The banality of evil is not only an external epistemic judgment, but plausibly, one about the person's disconnection from the on-the-ground-results of their action. His pen, paper, and letters caused more deaths than an army, much less a single person with a gun. Similar to Communist Russia and Mao's China, their abstract ideologies and layers of bureaucracy killed more people by starvation than most wars.
I think Arendt doesn't make a certain judgment about Eichmann. It's tough to know someone's motives, but her argument that his eiteology is not psychopathic or ideological, but career driven or superficial, is strong. That is the ultimate question. Is that banality possible? That's the debate.
Great review, Mark! I liked this book a lot. I think Arendt is remarkably perceptive and remarkably good at articulating what she perceives. The only other book of hers I've read is On Violence, which is short (really it's a long essay) and also very good. But I definitely want to read more.
As a corrective to the “uncritical” banality of evil you mention here, I recommend you take a look at the work of Ira Chaleff. He provides guidelines for “courageous followers” and “intelligent disobedience.”
I like his work and feature it heavily in my section on "Followership" in the book Ethical Leadership: A Primer. It's designed as an introduction to the intersection between ethics and leadership, so you might find it fun. I'd love to hear your feedback on the first half of the book, where we dig into specific ethical models (such as Kant's Categorical Imperative).
Can't help but read this in light of Pope Pius XII, who was the Pope during the Holocaust. He was crticized by both the Allies and Axis for his neutrality, and the Jewish community vehemently opposed his canonization due to his not being outspoken enough against Hitler. Despite this though, the Vatican functioned as one of the largest refugee networks for Holocaust survivors as well as one of the Allies' main spy networks due to the proximity of the Vatican with both Germany and Italy.
Indeed, Pius XII has been (sort of) condemned by history for doing something that was ostensibly a moral good. Some would say that he should have just been completely outspoken and dealt with the risk of opposing Hitler (such as the very real possibility that the Vatican would be taken over). Some others would say that he was simply "hedging his bets" in light of the tensions surrounding him geopolitically. He'd lean to one side or the other depending on the winds of change. Others would say that he was simply concerned with the preservation of human life, irregardless of political positioning. It makes me think that banality--as such--is independent of moral grounding. It's not that evil is inherently banal, for instance. There's something about Pius XII that makes me thing that the judgment of banal exists primarily as some kind of heuristic response to a line of decisions/actions that are on some level incomprehensible from a certain epistemic standpoint. Banality is not something that is intrinsic to any agent, but maybe rather an external judgment.
tl;dr--is there a possibility that Eichmann is only "banal" because Arendt cannot properly conceptualize his etiology? It seems a much more plausible thought to say that Eichmann was both stupid and immoral, but not banal as such. To that end, I do agree that this was primarily a psychological profiling of one person in the Nazi party. Disturbingly, there is a lot of diversisty with Nazi indoctrination--ranging from Himmler's Machiavellianism and the more violently radical antisemitism of SS personnel from Islamic territories such as Bosnia and Palestine.
Great insights Kobe. The Catholic Church is also a nearly two-thousand years old institution, so the pope's perspective is understandably removed and cautious. Something Arendt points out, however, is there where there was resistance to the "Final Solution," there were Nazis who rebelled against their orders. When the locals went along with the Holocaust, they had no social pushback, their consciences seemed to be drowned out.
The banality of evil is not only an external epistemic judgment, but plausibly, one about the person's disconnection from the on-the-ground-results of their action. His pen, paper, and letters caused more deaths than an army, much less a single person with a gun. Similar to Communist Russia and Mao's China, their abstract ideologies and layers of bureaucracy killed more people by starvation than most wars.
I think Arendt doesn't make a certain judgment about Eichmann. It's tough to know someone's motives, but her argument that his eiteology is not psychopathic or ideological, but career driven or superficial, is strong. That is the ultimate question. Is that banality possible? That's the debate.
Great review, Mark! I liked this book a lot. I think Arendt is remarkably perceptive and remarkably good at articulating what she perceives. The only other book of hers I've read is On Violence, which is short (really it's a long essay) and also very good. But I definitely want to read more.
As a corrective to the “uncritical” banality of evil you mention here, I recommend you take a look at the work of Ira Chaleff. He provides guidelines for “courageous followers” and “intelligent disobedience.”
Thanks for the rec Stan!
I like his work and feature it heavily in my section on "Followership" in the book Ethical Leadership: A Primer. It's designed as an introduction to the intersection between ethics and leadership, so you might find it fun. I'd love to hear your feedback on the first half of the book, where we dig into specific ethical models (such as Kant's Categorical Imperative).